Time Preference is a preference for earlier over later satisfaction, other things equal. Without further assumptions it cannot be equated with an observed interest rate, savings balance or someone’s moral worth.
In Human Action, Mises stresses the other-things-equal condition. Preferring the same satisfaction sooner does not mean that a small present consumption must outweigh any larger future benefit. His Austrian argument about the structure of action is different from an empirically measured personal discount rate. [Mises — Human Action, XVIII]
An offer of 100 today or 110 in a year changes both date and amount. Trust in payment, purchasing power, transaction costs and opportunities to invest meanwhile affect the outcome. One answer therefore cannot directly reveal pure time preference or apply to every life situation. [Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue — Time Discounting and Time Preference]
Someone who must pay for housing and cannot borrow may choose a smaller immediate amount despite planning for the long term. Income and liquidity changes alter feasible options. Low savings or a loan alone neither prove impatience nor rank a person’s worth. [Fisher — The Theory of Interest, XXI] [Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue — Time Discounting and Time Preference]
With constant discount factor delta, utility t periods ahead receives weight delta^t. Illustratively, delta = 0.95 gives weight 0.9025 after two periods. This is a model weight on utility, not automatically the price of money; converting it to an amount also requires a utility function and a specified period. [Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue — Time Discounting and Time Preference]
Laibson models an additional discount on delayed utility relative to immediate utility. A plan to wait can then change when one option becomes available now. Such time inconsistency differs from high but constant discounting; the model also explains motives for restricting one’s future choices in advance. [Laibson — Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting]
Fisher connects impatience, income opportunities and market conditions; the subjective side alone is insufficient in his model. For an actual loan also distinguish expected inflation, default risk and liquidity. A particular bank’s rate is therefore not a direct gauge of an entire society’s time preference. [Fisher — The Theory of Interest, XXI]
Bitcoin can form part of a long-term plan, but its price fluctuates and holding alone reveals neither motivation nor future consumption. A claim that buying BTC caused greater patience would need to separate selection of already patient people, wealth changes and other influences. The asset’s technical rules do not provide that causal evidence. [Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue — Time Discounting and Time Preference] [Bitcoin.org — Saving and volatility FAQ]
Specify the reward, dates, payment certainty, real or hypothetical incentives and financial constraints. Repeat comparable choices and distinguish an estimated parameter from behaviour another factor could have caused. Inferring a stable personal trait is a stronger claim than reporting one task’s result. [Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue — Time Discounting and Time Preference] [Laibson — Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting]
For the clearest picture, read this entry together with Capital Goods, Sound money, Marginal Utility, Human Action. The reverse links also lead from Austrian economics, Marginal Utility, Ordinal Utility, Opportunity Cost.