TROPIC01

A device need not perform every sensitive calculation in its main processor. It can delegate some work to a specialised security chip. TROPIC01 contains a RISC-V core that executes program instructions and SPECT, a coprocessor focused on cryptographic calculations. Firmware is the program running inside the chip; RTL is the source description of its logic circuits. Public documentation gives specialists access to these details. It enables examination without implying that every internal block of every shipped version is public or already independently verified. [1]

Behind the chip’s name is an exact part number identifying its initial software and permanent factory configuration. For TR01-C2P-T202, for example, the Part Numbers table lists application firmware 0.5.0 and SPECT firmware 0.3.1. Those programs can later be updated. Some settings and the certificate chain, the credentials used to verify origin, are instead established permanently during factory provisioning. Assessing a particular chip therefore requires its actual installed versions, not just its name. [2]

Developers need a way to send requests to the chip and read its responses. That is the purpose of libtropic, an SDK, or software development kit, for applications using the chip. This library runs on the device side that uses TROPIC01; it is not the chip’s internal firmware. API means the interface defining the agreed commands and responses. Documentation matches firmware versions to their API and datasheet, the component’s technical description. Updating the library therefore does not automatically update the chip; the versions must be compatible. [2] [3]

In its report of 3 June 2026, Ledger Donjon described tests on commercial samples with bootloader v2.0.1. A bootloader is the startup program that should verify firmware before allowing it to run. Researchers induced a fault with a laser and bypassed verification of an Ed25519 signature, the cryptographic evidence of the program’s authenticity. They did not break the mathematics of Ed25519; they disrupted the check performed by the chip. This was a physical laboratory test requiring component access and specialist equipment, not a remote internet attack. [4]

It helps to separate memory from execution. According to the manufacturer, modified firmware could remain in TROPIC01 memory after power-off. At the next startup, however, the chip checks its authenticity again. In the reported attack, each boot therefore required another physical disruption of that check. The presence of an attacker’s data in memory did not by itself make the program keep running without intervention. This is an important limit of the finding, not a reason to dismiss the vulnerability. [5]

MAC-and-Destroy is a mechanism that releases a corresponding secret for the correct input and limits attempts in hardware. Once that limit is exhausted, the secret can no longer be recovered. Initial Ledger Donjon tests did not defeat it even after gaining the ability to run modified firmware. Later internal analysis by Tropic Square found a way around it, and further independent tests also overcame the protection. The manufacturer temporarily withheld the details. The case shows why “we have not succeeded yet” does not prove that an attack is impossible. [4] [5]

The 2026 disclosure recommended disabling maintenance mode, which provides access to the update mechanism. This makes the attack more complex without eliminating it. The manufacturer also described a hardened hardware revision planned for late 2026. A plan cannot be presented as a fix already delivered, nor can older chips be assumed to have the new revision’s properties. What matters to users is their particular device maker’s notice: which units are affected and what remedy is actually available. [5]

Trezor explains that TROPIC01 in Trezor Safe 7 protects part of the secret material used to safeguard the PIN, the personal access code. According to the maker, neither the PIN itself nor the wallet backup is stored on this chip, and additional protective layers are involved. A chip-level finding therefore does not automatically mean the whole wallet is compromised. Additional protection is not immunity. A sound conclusion connects the particular product and its configuration with what the test actually established. [6]